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Base-rates of Negative Traits: Instructions for Use in Criminal Trials 
Federico Picinali 
 
ABSTRACT: Decision-makers in institutional and non-institutional contexts are sometimes 
confronted with the issue of whether to use generalisations expressing the statistical incidence 
of a negative trait in a disadvantaged and discriminated-against social group in order to draw an 
inference concerning a member of that group. If a criminal court were confronted with such a 
question, what answer should it give? First, the paper argues that, our qualms notwithstanding, 
morality does not demand that these generalisations be disregarded. In doing so, the paper 
addresses the relationship between factual accuracy and the demands of morality in criminal 
trials. Second, the paper considers the implications of this conclusion for the legal question as to 
whether the evidence at issue should be excluded, in particular, on grounds of unfairness – 
pursuant to section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In a possible world the Xs are a disadvantaged and discriminated-against ethnic 
minority. They mostly live in the suburbs of large cities, have humble jobs, and earn 
modest salaries; they rarely succeed in climbing the social ladder, mainly due to the 
unrelenting prejudices that the more advantaged citizens of different ethnic origins 
harbour towards them. Against this backdrop, we are not surprised to discover that 
the Xs engage in misconduct at a rate disproportionately higher than their fellow 
citizens. A rather grim picture, although a familiar one.1 
Jack is an X man. He is facing a criminal trial with the charge of inflicting grievous 
bodily harm on his daughter Merena. No one witnessed the alleged event and 
Merena is in a coma, therefore unable to testify. However, a neighbour reports that a 
few hours before the event, Merena and Jack had a heated discussion: during the 
confrontation Merena admitted to dating a man of another ethnic group and, in 
response to Jack’s anger at this news, she vehemently attacked the Xs’ traditional 
patriarchal values. A series of reliable sociological studies shows that the statistical 
incidence of violent chastisement is substantially higher among X fathers than 
among non-X fathers, and that it reaches its peak when X children disparage Xs’ 
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traditional values.2 The prosecution introduces these base-rates3 at trial with the aim 
of proving Jack’s propensity to harm his daughter. More precisely, the prosecution 
advances the following argument: all else being equal, the fact that Jack is an X man 
makes it more likely that he has injured his daughter than if Jack were not an X man; 
therefore, Jack’s membership in the class of X men is relevant information and it is 
probative of Jack’s criminal conduct. Call the base-rates, together with the argument 
built upon them, the ‘membership evidence’.4 Imagine that you were the authority in 
charge of adjudicating the case: should you rely on the membership evidence at all? 
Importantly, the question is not whether the membership evidence could be sufficient 
to conclude in a court of law that Jack is guilty; rather, it is whether the membership 
evidence should be given any role whatsoever in the inference, that is, whether it 
should be admitted as evidence in court.5 I will come back to the distinction between 
the question of admissibility and the question of sufficiency in due course. 
Many of us have intuitions about the question in italics. In particular, many think 
that there is something morally problematic with using arguments such as that 
advanced in Jack’s case. This uneasiness is experienced notwithstanding that the 
argument is known to be accurate. In the paper I try to unpack and test these 
intuitions. In section 2 I clarify the contours of the problem. In sections 3-7 I consider 
the problem from a moral standpoint, through elaborating and confuting arguments 
in favour of disregarding the evidence at issue. These arguments are predicated on 
ideas drawn, in particular, from literature on implicit bias, single-case inference, 
profiling, and generics. The upshot of this moral investigation is that there is no 
indefeasible moral reason against using the membership evidence in Jack’s case. In 
order to reach this conclusion, however, some provisos will need to be introduced 
along the way. In section 8 I consider the implications of the moral investigation for 
the legal question as to whether the evidence at issue should be excluded under the 
relevant provisions of English law, in particular, pursuant to section 78(1) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) – stating that “… the court may 
refuse to allow evidence … if it appears to the court that … the admission of the 
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evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that 
the court ought not to admit it.” More precisely, I address the legal questions 
concerning whether admitting the membership evidence would render the trial 
unfair and, in the event of a negative answer, whether there is any other ground on 
which to exclude such evidence.6 Finally, section 9 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Factual accuracy and the demands of morality 
The issue posed by our hypothetical case may be ascribed to the broader topic of the 
relationship between factual accuracy and the demands of morality in legal 
adjudication. Inquiring into this relationship is relevant to the legal decision as to 
whether to admit items of evidence in court. It is often the case that factual accuracy 
is instrumental to morality: its being grounded in accurate evidence and reasoning is 
generally among the conditions for the moral appropriateness of a legal judgment. 
However, there may be instances where morality requires that the adjudicator act as 
if she didn’t have some accurate evidence that she does have. The typical case is that 
of a defendant who confessed to committing a crime as a result of being tortured in a 
local police station or – to make the example more actual7 – in a foreign country by 
foreign secret services. Many would argue that morality demands that the state does 
not rely on the extorted confession in order to prove the defendant’s guilt, 
irrespective of how credible it may be. This argument may rest on the claim that 
using the confession would be unfair towards the defendant and would 
‘contaminate’8 the decision; but it may also rest on the claim that excluding the 
evidence is necessary to deter misconduct on the part of public officials.9 Arguments 
to the effect that morality demands the exclusion of the extorted confession are open 
to criticism.10 However, they are widely shared, they feature prominently in the 
national and supranational case law,11 and – at least some of them – have intuitive 
appeal on their side. This said, I do not intend to discuss the torture case any further. 
Instead, the question explored in the paper is whether in cases like Jack’s morality 
asks that criminal adjudication dispense with accurate information, that is, the 
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membership evidence. Some scholars have answered the question in the 
affirmative.12  
It is important to stress again that the question addressed here does not concern 
the sufficiency of the evidence, but its admissibility.  The issue is not whether the 
membership evidence could be sufficient for a finding that the defendant engaged in 
criminal conduct; it is, instead, whether this evidence should be relied upon at all by 
the fact finder, whatever the weight she may give to it. The question of sufficiency of 
the membership evidence has been discussed in the literature.13 This question 
presents some interesting theoretical aspects, but it has little practical relevance. 
First, it is very unlikely that someone could be brought to trial – indeed, that a case 
could make it to the trial! – on the basis of the membership evidence alone.14 Nor are 
there reasons to expect that this will happen in the future. Second, the question of 
sufficiency depends on the applicable standard of proof. Even if we were to 
conclude that the membership evidence is not morally problematic and can, 
therefore, be admitted at trial, it would be very unlikely that this evidence alone 
would ever be strong enough to satisfy the criminal standard of proof – i.e., proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.15 Of course, we may conjure up contrived examples to 
disprove this conclusion.16 However, all that these examples would do is to prove 
the conclusion wrong in a world that is very much unlike ours. 
Before addressing the question of admissibility from the standpoint of morality, it 
is necessary that we highlight the main features of Jack’s scenario. The 
considerations that follow in the next sections hinge upon one or more of these 
features. The first feature is the nature of the base-rates produced by the 
prosecution:17 generalisations concerning the incidence of a negative trait in 
members of a disadvantaged18 and discriminated-against social group.19 A negative 
trait is a morally objectionable behaviour or disposition: in Jack’s scenario it is the 
fact of engaging in violent chastisement. Importantly, the accuracy of the 
generalisations – and of the underlying research and reasoning – is not in doubt. The 
term ‘accuracy’ in the previous sentence refers to the generalisation’s reliability, as 
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indicated by factors such as sample size, randomisation and experimental design. 
Accuracy is, therefore, unrelated to the statistical incidence expressed in the 
generalisation itself:20 a universal generalisation may well be inaccurate.21 The 
second feature is the epistemic task for which the base-rates are employed. The task 
is to show that someone’s membership in a group makes her more likely to engage 
in particular behaviour. I have used the expression ‘membership evidence’ to refer to 
the base-rates together with the argument that is built upon them in order to fulfil 
this task. The third and the fourth features are typical of – but by no means exclusive 
to – the trial’s institutional setting. The third feature is the publicity of the judgment: 
a considerable amount of people may have access to it through direct experience or 
through the media.22 The fourth feature is the authority of the judgment: at least part 
of these people can be reasonably expected to defer to the decision and/or to its 
underlying reasoning.  
As evident from the above, my primary focus is on criminal trials. Not only has 
the present question been the object of academic attention with reference to this 
specific context;23 it is also reasonable to expect that social stratification, coupled with 
an increasing interest in empirical studies on the behaviour of social groups, will 
render the question more and more compelling in the forensic domain. 
Notwithstanding this main focus, the considerations that follow in sections 3-7 may 
apply to other instances of decision-making that present the four properties 
described in the previous paragraph, as well as to instances that have only some 
such features. In particular, I have in mind deliberations in both institutional and 
non-institutional contexts, such as deliberations by parliamentary commissions of 
inquiry, by disciplinary committees in private or public institutions, by historians 
and, most notably, by journalists. 
 
3. The argument from the immorality of beliefs 
Someone may argue that the membership evidence should be ignored because it is 
immoral to believe on the basis of this evidence that Jack is more likely to have committed the 
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crime than he would be were this evidence not available. At first glance the argument 
seems untenable. Since believing is something that happens to us, rather than 
something we choose to do, it appears that we cannot be held morally responsible 
for our believing that such and such is the case.24 However, it would be wrong to 
claim that we have no control whatsoever over our beliefs. While we cannot help 
(not) believing an hypothesis given the evidence of which we are aware, it is up to us 
to decide whether to embark on the investigation in the first place, whether to follow 
one or another of the possible investigative avenues open to us, and whether to give 
up the investigation at some stage, or to continue looking for further evidence that 
may update our beliefs. All of these decisions will impact, albeit indirectly, on what 
we believe. Thus, we do have a form of indirect control over our beliefs and, in light 
of this, the claim that we may be held responsible for them is defensible.  
I do not intend to enter into the debates on indirect control of beliefs and on 
doxastic responsibility. However, I am sceptical of their relevance to our question. 
The scholars who have argued for a notion of responsibility that may extend to our 
cognitive attitudes have done so with a particular type of attitudes in mind, to wit, 
false – or, at the least, misleading – representations of states of affairs.25 Possible 
examples thereof are those entrenched dispositional attitudes concerning racial, 
ethnic, religious, etc. groups, referred to in the literature as implicit biases.26 It may 
be reprehensible to hold a cognitive attitude of this sort precisely because something 
of epistemic relevance has gone awry in the enquiry that led to the attitude itself and 
because the attitude holder was somehow responsible for this failure.  
However, by hypothesis no similar epistemic failure characterises the 
membership evidence and the belief that this evidence may prompt, described 
above. The generalisation produced by the sociological study is accurate and it is 
arrived at in compliance with statistical rules of inference. Moreover, the argument 
to the effect that Jack’s membership in the class of X fathers makes him more likely 
to have committed the crime is hardly objectionable on epistemic grounds: it is a 
straightforward application of the logic of single-case inference.27 Every inference 
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regarding individual behaviour requires looking beyond the information we possess 
on the individual case28 – e.g., the fact of being an X father. In fact, this information is 
silent until we use it to ascribe the individual case to a suitable reference class – e.g., 
the class of X fathers. From observing the instances falling into this class we learn 
their behaviour. These statistical data are crucial to the single-case inference, as they 
allow us to correlate the evidence concerning the individual and the particular 
behaviour whose occurrence is at issue – e.g., whether an X father engaged in violent 
chastisement. In other words, they tell us whether this evidence has any probative 
value with respect to the fact in question. 
Now, if the accuracy of the evidence and of the belief that this evidence may 
prompt is not in question, our case is very much unlike that of implicit biases: no 
room seems left to argue that it is immoral to hold the belief at issue. In fact, would it 
be reasonable to claim that it may be immoral for someone to hold an accurate belief 
and, moreover, to hold it in the absence of any epistemic failure in the reasoning that 
led her to such belief? I believe it wouldn’t.  
The discussion so far does not rule out the argument that it is immoral to use the 
membership evidence in order to ascribe moral responsibility to an individual. The 
target of this argument is not the cognitive attitude, which the evidence may 
produce, on whether Jack engaged in certain conduct; it is, instead, the use of such 
evidence to justify a moral assessment of individual conduct.29  The arguments 
discussed in the next two sections are of this kind. 
 
4. The argument from autonomy 
It may be argued that using information pertaining to a group of people in order to 
ascribe moral responsibility for an act to an individual member of the group is 
immoral because it involves a lack of respect for the individual’s autonomy. The 
literature abounds in claims that seem to advance this argument.30 I will focus on 
two claims that have attracted particular scholarly attention. Taken at face value, 
these claims advance only an impoverished version of the argument from autonomy. 
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I will consider this version and confute it. Later, I will suggest a more charitable 
interpretation of the two claims, which allows for an improved version of the 
argument. This version too will be considered and, finally, rejected.  
David Wasserman writes: “…what is objectionable is the reliance on others’ 
conduct … to infer [the defendant’s] commission of a wrongful act. We object to this 
inference because it ignores the defendant’s capacity to diverge from his associates 
… thereby demeaning his individuality and autonomy”.31 In a similar vein Amit 
Pundik writes: “Inferences based on statistical evidence demean the individual’s 
autonomy because they regard her as a predetermined mechanism whose behaviour 
could be learnt by observing … the behaviour of other similar mechanisms”.32 Under 
a literal interpretation, these passages target the inference from group to individual. 
They say that it is morally wrong to use information on the behaviour of a group of 
people in order to draw an inference concerning the behaviour of an individual 
member of that group. This is because the inference demeans the autonomy of the 
individual. These claims are unconvincing, to say the least.  
In the previous section I pointed out that following the logic of single-case 
inferences is epistemically sound – and, I would add, necessary.33 On this basis, I 
argued that there is no ground to deem immoral the belief in a higher probability of 
commission of a certain act, which the inference may prompt. The reference to 
autonomy does not weaken this conclusion. There is no reasonable conception of 
autonomy under which the mere fact of drawing a sound inference concerning 
individual behaviour or of holding an accurate belief as a result of such inference 
would demean autonomy.34 Thus, under a literal interpretation of it, Wasserman’s 
and Pundik’s argument is not persuasive. And yet, at a closer look their words – in 
particular, Wasserman’s reference to the moral nature of the act to be proven – 
would seem to suggest that the authors are not targeting the inference per se, but the 
particular use to which the inference is put, namely, ascribing moral responsibility.35 
In light of this, it seems possible to advance a more defensible interpretation of their 
claims. According to this interpretation, Wasserman and Pundik are not arguing that 
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individual autonomy is violated by the inference or by the belief per se; they are 
arguing, instead, that individual autonomy is violated by the use of the inference in 
order to ascribe moral responsibility to an individual for a particular behaviour. I 
will now try to flesh out this alternative version of the argument from autonomy. 
As a starting point, I must clarify the conception of autonomy that the revised 
argument rests upon. Autonomy is understood as “a relationship between an agent 
and her motivational states”.36 It is the agent’s ability to make decisions on the basis 
of her beliefs and desires. According to this conception, the autonomous agent 
exercises authority over her decision-making: she decides which motivational states 
to follow and which to disregard. It is because of the exercise of authority in 
decision-making that we can consider the agent’s ensuing actions as hers, as an 
expression of her autonomy.  
The motivational states of an individual are often used as evidence to prove that 
the individual acted in a particular way. A typical example of this is the use of 
motive in criminal trials. Interestingly, if we use the membership evidence in order 
to draw an inference about the behaviour of the individual we completely bypass the 
consideration of the motivational states. The membership evidence allows us to 
‘jump’ to the conclusion that there is a certain probability that someone acted in a 
particular way, without inquiring into the reasons that she may have had to act 
thus.37 At best, our inquiry into the motivational states may stop at the consideration 
that some, most or all the members of the group may share similar motivational 
states, whatever these may be.38 By showing that there is a certain degree of 
uniformity in the behaviour of the group members, the membership evidence gives 
some support to this claim. As a result, we may conclude that if the individual has 
acted in a particular way, she may have done so because of reasons that are similar 
to those that motivated the members of the group who acted similarly. It goes 
without saying that this investigation into the individual’s motivational states is 
superficial, to say the least. 
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We can understand why the use of membership evidence may appear 
problematic within a process that ultimately aims at ascribing moral responsibility to 
an individual. Ascriptions of moral responsibility cannot leave aside the 
consideration of the motivational states of the individual. This holds true for the 
central cases of criminal responsibility, e.g., responsibility for murder, rape, theft, 
grievous bodily harm – the crime at issue in Jack’s case.  Inquiring into the reasons 
that motivated someone to behave in a particular way is crucial to determining her 
responsibility. While it may not be necessary that we know the motivational states 
that actually played a role in the individual’s decision-making, it is necessary that 
we exclude that the agent acted because of certain motivational states. For instance, 
before blaming and convicting Jack for harming Merena we should exclude the 
possibility that he acted in self-defence or under duress. On the other hand, it may 
be irrelevant to his responsibility whether he harmed Merena because he 
disapproved of the fact that she was seeing a non-X man or because he disapproved 
of Merena’s dress. However, more fundamental than inquiring into the content of 
the agent’s motivational states is inquiring into whether the agent behaved as she 
did because she was motivated to do so by her own states. After all, Jack may have 
harmed his daughter as a result of the directives given by one Dr Caligari,39 after 
being put by the doctor into a hypnotic state. Until we know that the action was 
prompted by the agent’s motivational states we cannot consider it as the expression 
of the agent’s autonomy, that is, as her action – and, possibly, as an action at all. This 
clarifies why Wasserman writes that using the membership evidence amounts to 
ignoring the agent’s capacity to diverge from what others do, and why Pundik 
resorts to the metaphor of the predetermined mechanism. Even if the membership 
evidence does permit us to draw inferences about the probability that the individual 
has acted in a particular way, this evidence does not give us the kind of information 
that we need in order to determine whether an action is attributable to the 
individual’s autonomous decision.40 It is on these grounds that the evidence should 
be excluded from a process that aims at ascribing responsibility: if we use it in order 
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to ascribe responsibility to an individual, we ignore and disrespect the individual’s 
autonomy. 
Even in its revised version, the argument from autonomy fails. The problem with 
this argument is that it confuses the ‘narrow’ aim with which the membership 
evidence is introduced by the prosecution – i.e., proving that Jack injured Merena – 
with the ‘broader’ aim of adjudication – i.e., determining whether Jack is to be held 
responsible for injuring Merena. It is true that in order to ascribe moral and criminal 
responsibility to Jack we must investigate into the content of his motivational states 
and, crucially, into the relationship between his behaviour and such states. However, 
this does not deny that we can find out how Jack behaved even without knowing 
anything about his motivational states. After all, eyewitnesses do not testify about 
the motivational states of the agent,41 but we still draw inferences about the agent’s 
behaviour based on their testimonies. When the membership evidence is used with 
the aim of proving a particular behaviour on the part of an individual, any concern 
that the individual’s autonomy may be demeaned by such use seems, therefore, 
unwarranted. The situation is radically different when it comes to ascribing moral or 
criminal responsibility to the individual because of how she behaved. For the 
ascription of responsibility it is necessary that we ascertain – possibly by using 
membership evidence – that the individual behaved in a particular way. But this is 
not yet sufficient: we must inquire into the agent’s motivational states and the 
relationship between such states and her behaviour, as described above. Of course, 
this inquiry will still be part of fact finding. The prosecution and the defence will 
have to produce evidence on whether the defendant’s act was voluntary (i.e., the 
product of her motivational states), whether she acted in self-defence, under duress, 
in a state of insanity etc.42 And, certainly, the membership evidence that may have 
been used to prove the defendant’s behaviour will not be of any help here.  
To conclude, proving conduct through inferences that sidestep the consideration 
of the motivational states and of their link with conduct does not amount to denying 
that inquiring into these facts is fundamental for moral and criminal responsibility. 
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This is because the immediate aim with which these inferences are employed – i.e., 
proving conduct – is but a step towards the achievement of the ultimate aim of 
ascribing responsibility. 
The argument from autonomy fails also in its revised version. It is not obvious 
how the argument could be unpacked in any more convincing fashion. 
 
 
5. The argument from the origin of the trait 
Certain negative traits characterising a disadvantaged and discriminated-against 
group may be attributed to the group’s condition of discrimination and deprivation. 
Ex hypothesi, the Xs are no exception to this. In fact, sociological research shows that 
X fathers’ violent manners in the enforcement of the Xs’ traditional values are a 
result of the mockery and contempt that these values are subjected to by members of 
more advantaged ethnic groups. Based on these findings it may be argued that we 
should not rely on Jack’s membership in the class of X fathers in order to determine 
whether he is responsible for harming his daughter.43 The argument would consist of 
two claims: (1) X fathers who engage in violent chastisement should be excused,44 
because their misconduct is ultimately determined by unjust social conditions 
affecting them, which they have not chosen, nor created themselves; (2), if (1), then 
in Jack’s case the membership evidence should be disregarded because, to the extent 
that this evidence proves that Jack has harmed his daughter, it implies that he is 
excused – and, therefore, should not be held responsible – for doing so. Both claims 
are unconvincing for the reasons stated below.  
As far as (1) is concerned, it is open to question whether the fact – which we are 
assuming ex hypothesi – that X fathers’ involuntary and unjust social condition 
explains their misconduct is sufficient to provide them with an excuse. If anything, 
their excuse may be partial. Thus, to hold X fathers responsible may still be an 
appropriate reaction to their behaviour. To be sure, these evaluations will depend 
upon the nature of the social conditions and of the negative trait at issue, and would 
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be very hard to make with respect to the group as a whole. Importantly, even if (1) 
were correct, (2) would not follow. As we saw in the previous section, the 
membership evidence does not give us adequate information – if any – on the 
motivational states of the agent. In fact, the evidence is introduced to prove Jack’s 
conduct. In order to ascertain whether Jack harmed Merena we don’t need to know 
his motivational states. Nor do we need to consider the social or personal conditions 
that produced those states. Because of its failure to give us information on the 
motivational states of Jack, the membership evidence cannot possibly support the 
claim that Jack should be excused for acting as he did. Other evidence is needed in 
order to reach this conclusion. Thus, at a first glance (2) seems untenable. However, 
the proponent of the argument from the origins of the trait would point out that we 
do have other evidence: it is the evidence provided by the sociological research 
mentioned at the start of this section. By virtue of Jack’s membership in the group of 
X fathers, the sociological evidence gives some information concerning his 
motivational states. On the basis of the sociological evidence, the proponent would 
then press the point that to the extent that we rely on the membership evidence to 
prove Jack’s conduct, we are bound to recognise that Jack is excused. More precisely, 
to the extent that we use the argument that Jack’s membership in the group of X 
fathers makes him more likely to have harmed Merena, we must accept the 
argument that Jack engaged in this conduct because of the involuntary and unjust 
social conditions that affect the Xs – call this claim (2.1). If so, we should not use the 
membership evidence at all, because of an alleged general principle according to 
which there is no good reason to invest resources into proving misconduct once we 
already know that the agent would be excused for it – call this claim (2.2). Not only 
would this be uneconomical, but it would also expose the defendant to an 
unnecessary painful ordeal. Jack’s conduct must be proven with evidence of a 
different kind.  
 (2.1) and (2.2) are nothing but the result of breaking down and fleshing out (2). I 
do not intend to take issue with (2.1). I will focus, instead, on (2.2). The main 
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problem with this claim is that it misconceives the nature and implications of 
excuses. The presence of an excuse does not authorise the adjudicator to turn a blind 
eye to the very behaviour for which someone is excused and to the consequences 
thereof. Therefore, the adjudicator should not disregard evidence on the ground that 
this evidence, by proving misconduct, would also serve as a basis for excusing the 
agent.45 Even if we knew in advance that X fathers, and Jack among them, would be 
excused for their misconduct, had they in fact misbehaved, this would not be a 
reason to abandon the investigation into whether misconduct indeed took place. 
Proving that misconduct occurred is important independently of the existence of an 
excuse. First, if there has been misconduct, the victims thereof would be no less 
harmed and/or wronged because of the presence of the excuse:46 ascertaining 
misconduct is necessary to recognising their status as victims. Moreover, 
establishing the dynamics – including misconduct and the reasons thereof – that led 
to victimisation is a necessary step towards addressing the issue of victimisation at 
its root. Proving that Jack, as well as other X fathers, engage in violent chastisement, 
and that they do so as a result of the conditions of oppression they suffer, is the 
premise for taking action towards the prevention of further misconduct – where 
prevention, of course, involves removing those social conditions in the first place.  
 
6. The argument from the ratchet effect 
The arguments considered and rejected so far aim at proving that there is something 
wrong in using the membership evidence when trying Jack, irrespective of the 
consequences of doing so. Other arguments focus, instead, on consequences: the 
argument from the ratchet effect is one of them. This argument rests on the attributes 
of publicity and of authoritativeness characterising the judgment involved in Jack’s 
case. 
Where a public and authoritative judgment relies on generalisations that report a 
higher rate of misconduct on the part of a group, this encourages law-enforcement 
agencies to adopt these generalisations in order to profile such group, i.e., to 
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dedicate wider resources to monitoring those individuals shown by the 
generalisation to be more likely to engage in misconduct.47 As explained by 
Harcourt,48 a notable problem49 with profiling is that it creates a gap between two 
proportions: the proportion of offenders of the targeted group within the overall 
population of offenders, and the proportion of convicted offenders of the targeted 
group within the overall population of convicted offenders. As a result of profiling, 
the second proportion is higher: the members of the group are over-represented 
within the population of convicted offenders. Moreover, if at a later stage law-
enforcement agencies use the second proportion to shape new profiling practices, 
the gap is further widened. This is the ratchet effect. Needless to say, this effect 
evidences an unequal treatment of similarly positioned individuals: whereas ceteris 
paribus all offenders should be treated equally, an offender’s membership in a group 
makes it more or less likely that she will be prosecuted and convicted. Now, given 
that profiling produces this deleterious effect – which, as Harcourt shows, has 
negative repercussions on the social conditions of the profiled group – we should 
avoid practices that encourage it. Using the membership evidence in a public and 
authoritative judgment is one such practice. This evidence – the argument concludes 
– should be disregarded. 
The argument from the ratchet effect points us in a new interesting direction. In 
contrast with the previous arguments, it leads us to shift our consideration to the 
consequences of using the membership evidence in Jack’s case and, then, to ask 
whether these consequences may render this usage immoral. Nevertheless, the 
argument from the ratchet effect is weak. As explained above, the argument claims 
that using membership evidence is wrong because it is conducive to profiling and 
because profiling produces the despised ratchet effect. The weak link lies in positing 
that a public and authoritative reliance on membership evidence in judgments of the 
sort discussed here will result in the respective base-rates being used for profiling. 
Such a result cannot be ruled out, of course; yet it is not a necessary consequence. 
Law-enforcement practices are generally subject to policymaking and supervision; 
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they are not – and/or should not be – at the discretion of the individual officer. This 
means that if policymakers and supervisors acknowledge the ratchet effect of 
profiling and discourage and reprimand this practice, the risk that individual 
officers will profile a certain group out of deference to the judgment may be reduced 
within acceptable limits. In conclusion, while the argument from the ratchet effect 
may provide strong evidence against profiling, it does not extend its purview to the 
use of membership evidence in cases similar to Jack’s, insofar as the appropriate 
measures are in place.50 
 
7. The argument from the biased audience 
A more promising argument focussing on consequences is the argument from the 
biased audience. As mentioned in section 2, the attributes of publicity and of 
authoritativeness signify, respectively, that a considerable amount of people may 
have access to the judgment, and that some of them may defer to it and to the 
underlying reasoning. I shall refer to this part as ‘the audience’. Considering the 
social conditions of the Xs as depicted in the introduction, it is reasonable to expect 
that a segment of the audience – in particular, the non-X audience – is biased against 
the Xs. The biased audience generally attributes to some or all the Xs negative traits 
that none of them possesses or it exaggerates the statistical incidence within the X 
population of negative traits that some Xs do possess. A public and authoritative 
judgment reporting a negative trait of the Xs creates the conditions for the bias to 
operate. 
As implausible as it seems, imagine that the base-rate in Jack’s case expressed a 
probability of 1, therefore being universal: all X fathers resort to violent chastisement. 
In other words, given that someone is an X father he will certainly engage in this 
practice. If the adjudicator decides to use this generalisation as evidence of Jack’s 
misconduct, there is no risk that the biased audience will misread the generalisation 
by exaggerating the statistical incidence of the negative trait attributed to X fathers. 
In fact, by hypothesis, all X fathers engage in violent chastisement: no room is left for 
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a distortion of reality through overestimating the incidence of the trait. Now 
consider the more realistic case in which the base-rate expresses a probability that is 
lower than 1. Depending on how much lower than 1 the probability is, there will be 
more or less opportunity for the biased audience to form a distorted representation 
of reality by attributing a stronger probative value to the generalisation. For instance, 
generalisations to the effect that “55 per cent” of X fathers resort to violent 
chastisement may be distorted, and may be understood as if they expressed a 
considerably higher probability. This is even more likely to occur if the 
generalisation is conveyed using quantifiers rather than numbers: the former are 
vaguer and leave greater room for (mis)interpretation. Importantly, the claim is not 
that if a member of the biased audience were asked to state the number or quantifier 
expressed in the generalisation used in the judgment she would be likely to mis-state 
it by erring on the side of excess. This is possible, of course, and may be evidence of 
a particularly strong bias. Rather, the claim is that the biased audience would 
probably form an inaccurate understanding as to what that very number or 
quantifier signifies. The mechanism is similar to that of the ‘bias of imaginability’ 
described by Tversky & Kahneman.51 Even in the lack of the experience of a 
particular event, the ease with which this event is imagined may determine the belief 
in the probability that the event indeed occurs. For an individual biased against the 
Xs, it will be relatively easy to imagine that they present a negative trait. Once a 
judgment has explicitly associated the Xs with a negative trait, the biased individual 
may believe that the trait is more probable within the population of the Xs than the 
judgment actually suggests.52 In fact, this mechanism may also be ascribed to the 
category of confirmation biases, being an instance in which the individual affected 
by the bias selectively reinterprets evidence, so as to bring it into accord with, and to 
confirm, the bias itself. 
There is an additional problem. Not only may the biased audience magnify the 
statistical incidence of the trait; especially when the generalisation used in the 
judgment already expresses a high incidence, there is a risk that the biased audience 
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may slide into the language and logic of ‘generics’. Generics are generalisations of a 
particular kind: they omit quantifiers, let alone numerical probabilities. As a result, 
they are liable to be understood as claims about the essential – or natural – traits of a 
category,53 that is, traits that define the members of that category. The generic ‘the Xs 
have trait f’ may convey that having f is rooted in what it is to be an X. Particularly 
when it comes to negative traits, it is easy to appreciate the distorting effects of this 
discourse. 
Why should we worry about this at all? The answer is simple: we don’t want the 
Xs to be further burdened by the spreading of false negative stereotypes. If our 
conduct increases the probability of this happening, morality provides reasons for 
behaving differently. Now, is there a way to use the membership evidence and, at 
the same time, to prevent the biased audience from misunderstanding the statistical 
incidence of the negative trait and the nature of such trait? There may be a way to do 
so: providing lay people with a clear explanation of the significance of the base-rate, 
also mentioning in peremptory terms the interpretations and uses thereof that are 
not epistemically warranted.54 The expectation is that conveying this information 
would make it harder for the bias to operate, if not neutralise its effect altogether. By 
this I do not mean to say that the bias would be eradicated: this aim cannot possibly 
be achieved by the ‘explanatory tactic’ suggested here, nor is it necessary to achieve 
it in order to offset the argument from the biased audience. The debiasing effect of 
this tactic, instead, would be limited to preventing a pejorative misinterpretation of 
the base-rate in the particular case.55 Notably, a bias may be explicit or implicit, 
depending on whether or not a person consciously relies on it when forming beliefs 
and choosing courses of action.56 Whatever the form of the bias, the tactic provides 
compelling information that – absent a mala fide endorsement of inaccuracies – 
would seem to leave no room for misunderstanding the particular base-rate to the 
detriment of the disadvantaged and discriminated-against social group. Bias-
induced false beliefs on the significance and the implications of the base-rate may, 
thus, be averted. To the extent that this can be achieved, the argument from the 
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biased audience loses its bite. True, critics of the adequacy of the explanatory tactic 
as a response to the argument from the biased audience may point out that the tactic 
should be subjected to appropriate testing. However, the same need for testing 
applies to the argument from the biased audience in the first place!57  
 
8. An unfair trial for Jack? 
As previously pointed out the moral arguments against using the membership 
evidence in Jack’s case may be grouped into two classes. On the one hand, there are 
arguments that insist on the immorality of using this evidence irrespective of the 
consequences of doing so. On the other, there are arguments to the effect that the 
immorality derives from the consequences of such use. The former are unsuccessful. 
The arguments from consequences are more compelling. However, these arguments 
may be offset through implementing measures to prevent the use of the evidence 
from leading to undesirable ramifications. Is it possible to formulate other 
reasonable and more successful arguments against using the membership evidence? 
I have not (yet) managed to do so, but other scholars are warmly invited to try. 
Provided that there are cases where morality demands that we disregard what is 
true and relevant to decision-making, it is doubtful that Jack’s is one of them. What 
are the implications of this conclusion for the question of whether in a criminal trial 
the membership evidence at issue should be excluded pursuant to section 78(1) 
PACE 1984? As you will recall, this section states that “… the court may refuse to 
allow evidence … if it appears to the court that … the admission of the evidence 
would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court 
ought not to admit it.” Is it the case that admitting the membership evidence would 
render the trial unfair? In this section I shall answer this question in the negative. 
However, I shall also show that this is not the end of the matter: there is still an 
argument, unrelated to the issue of trial fairness, that suggests excluding the 
evidence. This argument will be assessed and, ultimately, rejected. 
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The notion of trial fairness that is relevant to the application of s78(1) is a 
‘defendant-centred’ notion.58  With this expression I mean to say that whether the 
trial is rendered unfair by the decision to admit the evidence depends on whether 
that decision is found to have wronged the defendant and to have affected 
negatively her situation at trial. This is not to claim that, while assessing the fairness 
of the trial, the European Court of Human Rights and the English courts do not 
consider factors other than the wrong suffered by the defendant. Whether rightfully 
or not, these courts do consider other factors – for instance, the seriousness of the 
crime charged and the related factor consisting in the public interest in achieving a 
conviction.59 My point is merely that in order for a claim of unfairness to succeed, it 
must be shown that the defendant was wronged by the decision to admit the 
evidence and that her case was made worse off by such decision.  
We saw that of the arguments explored above only the two arguments from 
consequences seem to carry some weight – for the time being I leave aside the 
consideration of their respective countermeasures. I shall, therefore, concentrate 
exclusively on these two arguments.60 Notably, neither of them is defendant-centred: 
they aim to show that admitting the evidence would (or may) amount to wronging 
the entire social group to which the defendant belongs. According to these 
arguments, what is (or may be) wrongly affected by using the evidence is not the 
defendant’s situation at trial, but the group’s social condition.61 If this is correct, it 
follows that, irrespective of the weight that is given to such arguments, a court could 
not exclude the membership evidence on grounds of unfairness following either of 
them. It would seem, therefore, that section 78(1) PACE 1984 and the related notion 
of trial fairness do not provide the appropriate conceptual framework through 
which to funnel the only promising arguments against admission. This conclusion, 
however, would be too hasty. On closer examination, we find that at least one of the 
arguments from consequences does raise important concerns about using the 
membership evidence and may possibly raise the issue of trial fairness as well. This 
is due to the particular features of the criminal trial, which cast doubt on whether the 
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countermeasures that would offset the argument are sufficient and, indeed, 
practicable. 
The argument from the ratchet effect is straightforwardly handled. It is, after all, 
an argument against profiling rather than against relying on the membership 
evidence in trial fact finding. As was shown, to the extent that measures can be 
implemented in order to prevent profiling practices on the part of law-enforcement 
authorities, the argument loses all its strength. We have no reason to assume that 
these measures cannot be implemented.  
Offsetting the argument from the biased audience in the trial context is, however, 
more complicated. In the previous section I argued that an effective countermeasure 
against the operation of biases harboured by the audience would be to explain the 
significance of the generalisation at issue, clearly mentioning the interpretations and 
uses thereof that are not epistemically warranted. The problem is that criminal trials 
present certain features that may render this explanatory tactic insufficient and 
impracticable.62 First, when fact finding is the task of a jury of lay people, it is 
reasonable to expect that fact finders themselves may harbour biases against the 
disadvantaged and discriminated-against social group to which the defendant 
belongs. In light of this it is possible to formulate a defendant-centred version of the 
argument from the biased audience – which we may call, in the absence of a more 
inventive name, ‘the argument from the biased jury’ – susceptible therefore to 
raising the question of trial fairness. If jurors may be biased, admitting evidence 
likely to trigger such bias may have the effect of distorting fact finding to the 
detriment of the defendant: jurors may interpret the evidence as being stronger than 
it really is. Therefore, such evidence should be excluded pursuant to section 78(1) 
PACE 1984. However, the criminal trial already has devices rendering the exclusion 
of the membership evidence superfluous as a safeguard against the unfair outcome 
envisaged in this argument, and thus, all things considered, a negative measure. It is, 
in fact, possible to implement the explanatory tactic – targeted, this time, on jurors – 
through using jury directions and judicial comment, and to enforce this tactic 
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through appellate review. By hindering the operation of the bias as argued in the 
previous section, these devices seem to provide sufficient ground on which to rebut 
the defendant-centred argument from the biased jury.63 
Second, notoriously, juries do not give reasons for their verdict; also, the jury 
room is a ‘black box’, the inviolability of which is protected through criminal 
sanctions. This seems to cast doubts on the adequacy of the explanatory tactic as a 
countermeasure to the argument from the biased audience. The audience has access 
to information concerning the evidence admitted at trial and the verdict. Instead, the 
reasoning underlying the verdict, which would be the ideal source of information on 
the epistemic significance of the membership evidence and its epistemically 
impermissible uses, is beyond reach. As a result, it would seem that the audience can 
receive no guidance concerning these important matters. Nothing precludes, though, 
that jury directions could perform as explanatory a function with respect to the 
audience as they do with respect to the jury. To the extent that the public is exposed 
to the trial and the evidence presented therein, it is also exposed to jury directions, as 
these are publicly given in a (crucial) trial phase. True, jury directions are by 
definition instituted and devised for juries. However, if the communication between 
the court and the jury can produce a valuable epiphenomenon in terms of sending a 
message to members of the public, it is reasonable to take this into account and 
acknowledge its worth when addressing the problem of public misunderstanding. 
Even in the case of audiences of jury trials it seems, therefore, that the explanatory 
countermeasure can be implemented: the reasons for exclusion are weakened, if not 
defeated.  
 
9. Conclusion 
The upshot of this paper is that there is no indefeasible moral reason to disregard 
base-rate of a negative trait in a disadvantaged and discriminated-against social 
group, when drawing an inference concerning a member of that group in a criminal 
trial. In light of the results of our moral investigation, I have made a prima facie case 
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for the claim that section 78(1) PACE 1984 does not provide the right framework for 
deciding the question of admissibility: it is incorrect to address the problem of 
admissibility as being a problem of trial fairness. However, the argument from the 
biased audience seems to present peculiar issues in the context of jury trials, given 
that in such context the explanatory tactic – which would offset the argument – 
seems insufficient and impracticable. This provides grounds for excluding the 
evidence, one of which raises the issue of trial fairness. I have shown that these 
reasons for exclusion are not insuperable: jury directions can be conceived of as the 
device through which to implement the explanatory tactic towards both jurors and 
the public. 
The foregoing discussion – and the argument from the biased audience, in 
particular – suggests that the question of admissibility may be triggered and 
determined by considerations unrelated to the impact that certain evidence may 
have on the defendant’s situation at trial. It seems reasonable to argue that the 
dynamics of the trial and its epilogue should also be informed by a certain degree of 
consideration for external factors, such as the public perception of criminal justice.64 
The above suggestion, however, raises a question that is not limited to the public 
perception of criminal justice. It is the question whether and to what extent any 
decision-making taking place during the criminal process – e.g., the decision on the 
admission of evidence, the decision whether to convict, the decision on sentence – 
should be carried out with an eye to preventing or resolving problems that pertain 
outside the criminal process and concern people other than those directly involved 
in it. This is a broad and difficult question that I leave for further research. 
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would need to be tested. The first assumption is that the membership evidence would be used very 
frequently, if considered admissible at trial. The second assumption is that X fathers would be 
convicted more often if the membership evidence were admitted. This depends on the strength of the 
membership evidence vis-à-vis that of the other evidence available. It may be that in many cases the 
other evidence is sufficiently strong and, therefore, the membership evidence does not play any 
crucial role in securing conviction. The third assumption is that membership evidence would not be 
used – or would not be used as often and successfully – in trials of members of other social groups. 
51 See Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’, Science 
185 (1974): pp. 1127-1128. 
52 In addition to its apparent plausibility, the claim that the biased audience is likely to misinterpret 
the base-rate through magnifying the statistical incidence of the negative trait is clearly consistent 
with the empirical studies that have been conducted on the operation of implicit biases (see John T. 
Jost, Laurie A. Rudman, Irene V. Blair, Dana R. Carney, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Jack Glaser, Curtis D. 
Hardin, ‘The Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and 
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54 E.g., an explanation to the effect that ‘a generalisation stating that 70% of X fathers engage in violent 
chastisement is not sufficient evidence to conclude that any given X father has engaged in such 
practice; furthermore, it does not allow for the conclusion that there is something about the nature of 
X fathers which brings them violently to chastise their children.’ This, of course, is just a sketch: the 
more precise and clear the explanation, the better. 
55 Understanding the limited scope of the explanatory tactic is crucial to appreciate its viability. For 
the success of this tactic it is not necessary that biased individuals acknowledge their bias, which is 
certainly an important condition for the eradication of biases. As suggested by the psychological 
research, an individual’s acknowledgment of her biases is rare, because biases may not be available to 
introspection (see Brian A. Nosek, Anthony G. Greenwald, Mahzarin R. Banaji, ‘The Implicit 
Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review’ in J. A. Bargh (ed.), Automatic 
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Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007): p. 566). As a result of these two factors, our biases may remain 
hidden behind a ‘blind spot’ that causes us to be readier to impute them to others, than to ourselves. 
This makes it all the more difficult to eradicate biases, but it may not be equally problematic when the 
aim is merely that of neutralising the operation of the bias in a particular instance. 
56 Cf. Holroyd (2014), op. cit., arguing that implicit biases do not exclude some kind of awareness of 
the distorting cognitive processes characterising biased reasoning. 
57 Lilienfeld et al. write that the literature on debiasing techniques against confirmation bias is 
characterised “by three glaring facts: the paucity of research on the topic, the lack of theoretical 
coherence among differing debiasing techniques, and the decidedly mixed research evidence 
concerning their efficacy” (see Scott O. Lilienfeld, Rachel Ammirati, Kristin Landfield, ‘Giving 
Debiasing Away: Can Psychological Research on Correcting Cognitive Errors Promote Human 
Welfare?’, Perspectives on Psychological Science 4 (2009): p. 393). They add that “there is a pressing need 
for additional research on concerted efforts to combat confirmation bias and related biases” 
(Lilienfeld et al., op. cit., p. 395), because “a plausible case can be made that debiasing people against 
errors in thinking could be among psychology’s most enduring legacies to the promotion of human 
welfare” (Lilienfeld et al., op. cit., p. 391). A test of the accuracy of the argument from the biased 
audience and of the efficacy of the explanatory tactic devised to defeat it may be part of this welfare-
promoting project. 
58 Courts have recognized that trial fairness is a ‘two-way street’, i.e., that the trial should be fair for 
the prosecution as well. However, as far as s78(1) PACE is concerned, the issue is to determine 
whether the admission of an item of evidence would render the trial unfair for the defendant. In fact, 
s78(1) applies only to evidence “on which the prosecution proposes to rely”. 
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to a Fair Trial’, Criminal Law Review 1 (2014): 4-29. 
60 As was shown, both the argument from the ratchet effect and the argument from the biased 
audience rely on the publicity (and authority) of the adjudicative process. As far as trials are 
concerned, publicity is not just a reality – see the considerable amount of high-profile cases that are 
meticulously reported in the news and sometimes broadcast, attracting vivid public attention – but 
also a legal safeguard – see article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
61 One may argue – based on the arguments from consequences – that the defendant is wronged by 
virtue of being a member of the social group (and that her case at trial is made worse off by the 
introduction of new incriminating evidence). It is highly doubtful that this would be considered 
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the adjudicator (in particular, the court) with implementing the explanatory tactic. The question is 
whether the adjudicator has the means to do so. As I will argue, she does. 
63 Again, whether the argument from the biased audience and the explanatory tactic work should be 
subject to testing. And again, if jurors are prone to accepting inaccuracies mala fide, neither jury 
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